James Turk
May 4 2009 2:32PM
A Short History of the Gold Cartel
This week Bill Murphy and Chris Powell, co-founders of the
Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee (www.gata.org), will be in London, England.
Their trip is part of GATA’s ongoing effort to raise awareness of the
gold cartel and its surreptitious intervention in the gold market.
Bill and Chris will meet with the British media to explain
GATA’s findings. They will also attend an important fund raising
event being held in support of GATA’s work. Their trip is another
important step by GATA aimed at creating a free market in gold, one which
is unfettered by government intervention.
Governments want a low gold price to make national
currencies look good. Gold is recognizable the world over as the
‘canary in the coalmine’ when it comes to money. A rising
gold price blurts the unpleasant truth that a national currency is being
poorly managed and that its purchasing power is being inflated.
This reality is made clear by former Federal Reserve
chairman Paul Volcker. Commenting in his memoirs about the soaring gold
price in the years immediately following the end of the gold standard in
1971, he notes: “Joint intervention in gold sales to prevent a
steep rise in the price of gold, however, was not undertaken. That was a
mistake.” It was a mistake because a rising gold price
undermines the thin reed upon which all fiat currency rests –
confidence. But it was a mistake only from the perspective of a
central banker, which is of course at odds with anyone who believes in free
markets.
The US government has learned from experience and taken
Volcker’s advice. Given the US dollar’s role as the
world’s reserve currency, the US government has the most to lose if
the market chooses gold over fiat currency and erodes the
government’s stranglehold on the monopolistic privilege that it has
awarded to itself of creating ‘money’.
So the US government intervenes in the gold market to make
the dollar look worthy of being the world’s reserve currency when of
course it is not equal to the demands of that esteemed role. The US
government does this by trying to keep the gold price low, but this aim is
an impossible task. In the end, gold always wins, i.e., its price
inevitably climbs higher as fiat currency is debased, which is a reality
understood and recognized by government policymakers. So recognizing the
futility of capping the gold price, they instead compromise by letting the
gold price rise somewhat, say, 15% per annum. In fact, against the
dollar, gold is actually up 16.3% p.a. on average for the last eight years.
In battlefield terms, the US government is conducting a managed retreat for
fiat currency in an attempt to control gold’s advance.
Though it has let the gold price rise, gold has risen by
less than it would in a free market because the purchasing power of the
dollar continues to be inflated and also because gold remains so
undervalued notwithstanding its annual appreciation this decade. These
gains started from gold’s historic low valuation in 1999. Gold
may not be as good a value as it was in 1999, but it nevertheless remains
extremely undervalued.
For example, until the end of the 19th century,
approximately 40% of the world’s money supply consisted of gold, and
the remaining 60% was national currency. As governments began to
usurp the money issuing privilege and intentionally diminish gold’s
role, fiat currency’s role expanded by the mid-20th century to
approximately 90%. The inflationary policies of the 1960s, particularly in
the US, further eroded gold’s role to 2% by the time the last
remnants of the gold standard were abandoned in 1971. Gold’s
importance rebounded in the 1970s, which caused Volcker to lament the
so-called mistakes of policymakers. Its percentage rose to nearly 10% by
1980. But gold’s percent of the world money supply thereafter
declined, reaching about 1% in 1999. Today it still remains below 2%.
From this analysis it is reasonable to conclude that gold
should comprise at least 10% of the world’s money supply. Because it
is nowhere near that level, gold is undervalued.
So given the ongoing dollar debasement being pursued
by US policymakers, keeping gold from exploding upward to a true
free-market price is the first thing they gain from their interventions in
the gold market. The other thing they gain is time. The time they gain
enables them to keep their fiat scheme afloat so they can benefit from it,
delaying until some future administration the scheme's inevitable collapse.
So how does the US government manage the gold price? They
recruit Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase and Deutsche Bank to do it, by
executing trades to pursue the US government’s aims. These banks are
the gold cartel. I don't believe that there are any other members of the
cartel, with the possible exception of Citibank as a junior member. The
cartel acts with the implicit backing of the US government to absorb all
losses that may be taken by the cartel members as they manage the gold
price and further, to provide whatever physical metal is required to
execute the cartel's trading strategy. How did the gold cartel come about?
There was an abrupt change in government policy circa
1990. It was introduced by then Federal Reserve chairman Alan
Greenspan in order to bail out the banks back then, which like now were
insolvent. Taxpayers were already on the hook for hundreds of billions to
bail out the collapsed ‘savings & loan’ industry, so adding
to this tax burden was untenable. He therefore came up with an
alternative.
Greenspan saw the free market as a golden goose with
essentially unlimited deep pockets, and more to the point, that these
pockets could be picked by the US government using its tremendous weight,
namely, its financial resources for timed interventions in the free market
combined with its propaganda power by using the media. In short, it was
easier to bail out the insolvent banks back then by gouging ill-gained
profits from the free markets instead of raising taxes.
Banks generated these profits by the Federal
Reserve’s steepening of the yield curve, which kept long-term
interest rates relatively high while lowering short-term rates. To earn
this wide spread, banks leveraged themselves to borrow short-term and use
the proceeds to buy long-term paper. This mismatch of assets and
liabilities became known as the carry-trade.
The Japanese yen was a particular favorite to borrow. The
Japanese stock market had crashed in 1990, and the Bank of Japan was
pursuing a zero interest rate policy to try reviving the Japanese economy.
A US bank could borrow Japanese yen for 0.2% and buy US T-notes yielding
more than 8%, pocketing the spread, which did wonders for bank profits and
rebuilding their capital base.
Gold also became a favorite vehicle to borrow because of
its low interest rate. This gold came from central bank coffers, but they
refused to disclose how much gold they were lending, making the gold market
opaque and ripe for intervention by central bankers making decisions behind
closed doors. The amount lent by central banks has been reliably
estimated in various analyses published by GATA to be 12,000 to 15,000
tonnes, nearly one-half of central banks total holdings and 4-to-6 times
annual new mine production of 2500 tonnes. The banks clearly jumped feet
first into the gold carry-trade.
The carry-trade was a gift to the banks from the Federal
Reserve, and all was well provided the yen and gold did not rise against
the dollar because this mismatch of dollar assets and yen or gold
liabilities was not hedged. Alas, both gold and the yen began to
strengthen, which if allowed to rise high enough would force
marked-to-market losses on those carry-trade positions in the banks. It was
a major problem because the losses of the banks could be considerable,
given the magnitude of the carry-trade.
So the gold cartel was created to manage the gold price,
and all went well at first, given the help it received from the Bank of
England in 1999 to sell one-half of its gold holdings. Gold was driven to
historic lows, as noted above, but this low gold price created its own
problem. Gold became so unbelievably cheap that value hunters around the
world recognized the exceptional opportunity it offered, and demand for
physical gold began to climb. As demand rose, another more intractable and
unforeseen problem arose for the gold cartel.
The gold borrowed from the central banks had been melted
down and turned into coins, small bars and monetary jewelry that were
acquired by countless individuals around the world. This gold was now in
‘strong hands’, and these gold owners would only part with it
at a much higher price. Therefore, where would the gold come from to
repay the central banks?
While yen is a fiat currency and can be created out of thin
air by the Bank of Japan, gold in contrast is a tangible asset. How
could the banks repay all the gold they borrowed without causing the gold
price to soar, further worsening the marked-to-market losses on their
remaining positions?
In short, the banks were in a predicament. The Federal
Reserve’s policies were debasing the dollar, and the ‘canary in
the coalmine’ was warning of the loss of purchasing power. So
Greenspan's policy of using interventions in the market to bail-out banks
morphed yet again.
The gold borrowed from central banks would not be repaid
because obtaining the physical gold to repay these loans would cause the
gold price to soar. So beginning this decade, the gold cartel would
conduct the government’s managed retreat, allowing the gold price to
move generally higher in the hope that, basically, people wouldn’t
notice. Given its ‘canary in a coalmine’ function, a rising
gold price creates demand for gold, and a rapidly rising gold price would
worsen the marked-to-market losses of the gold cartel.
So the objective is to allow the gold price to rise around
15% p.a., while at the same time enable the cartel members to intervene in
the gold market with implicit government backing in order to earn profits
to offset the growing losses on its gold liabilities. Its trading strategy
to accomplish this task is clear. The gold cartel reverse engineers the
black-box trend-following trading models.
Just look at the losses taken by some of the major
commodity trading managers on their gold trading over the last
decade. It is hundreds of millions of dollars of client money lost,
and gained for the gold cartel to help offset their losses from the gold
carry-trade. All to make the dollar look good by keeping the gold
price lower than it should be and would be if it were allowed to trade in a
market unfettered by government intervention.
There are only two outcomes as I see it. Either the gold
cartel will fail in the end, or the US government will have destroyed what
remains of the free market in America. I hope it is the former, but the
continuing flow of events from Washington, D.C. and the actions of
policymakers suggest it could be the latter.
*****
James Turk is the Founder & Chairman of
GoldMoney.com <http://goldmoney.com/>. He is the
co-author of The Coming Collapse of the Dollar, which has been
updated for a newly released paperback version, now entitled The
Collapse of the Dollar <www.dollarcollapse.com>.
Copyright © 2009 by James Turk. All rights
reserved.