The Bigger and Riskier Monster
by Mart
in D. Weiss, Ph.D. 11-30-09
Martin here with an
urgent reminder that, despite what you may be hearing from Washington, risk
is still a four-letter word.
And despite solemn
vows to the contrary, the U.S. government is promoting risk with new-found
enthusiasm and gall.
Again!
Yes, Fed Chairman
Bernanke says he wants to avoid the possible risk of a future
speculative bubble.
And yes, Treasury
Secretary Geithner says he wants to reform financial regulation
to avoid a future debt disaster.
But even while they
give lip service to protecting you, they stand by passively as derivatives
grow explosively.
Derivatives are debts
and bets of all shapes and sizes, especially on interest rates, bonds,
mortgage-backed securities, and other fixed instruments.
They were at the
epicenter of the financial earthquake that shook the world last year. They
triggered the demise of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and many
others. And they’re still causing a series of aftershocks
around the world, as in Dubai late last week.
So you’d think
the authorities would have taken steps to reduce their threat to the U.S.
banking system.
Not quite! Despite a
brief reduction in derivatives outstanding in last year’s third
quarter, U.S. commercial banks now hold a grand total of $203.5 trillion in
derivatives, a new all-time high.
What’s worse,
there has been no change whatsoever in the stranger-than-fiction
facts behind that number — namely that …
- A whopping 97
percent of all U.S. bank-held derivatives are concentrated in the hands of
just FIVE institutions — JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Bank of
America, Citibank and Wells Fargo.
- JPMorgan alone
holds $79.9 trillion in derivatives — more than the grand total held
by Bank of America and Citibank combined. (For the evidence, click
here.)
- Over 96 percent
of all U.S. bank-held derivatives are traded over the counter, outside of
any regulated exchange — a wild zone where neither central authority
nor national responsibility play a significant role. (The
evidence.)
- Although some
banks have made some progress in reducing their credit exposure, Citibank
is still risking over double its capital … JPMorgan is still risking
nearly three times its capital … and Goldman Sachs is still risking
over NINE times its capital — all on the bet that their
counterparties will not default.
- The derivatives
held by insurance companies like AIG aren’t even included in this
tally. Yet, in a confidential memorandum leaked to the press earlier this
year, AIG executives confessed that
“Systemic risk
[triggered largely by derivatives] afflict all life insurance and
investment firms around the world … If AIG were to fail, it is
likely to have a cascading impact on a number of U.S. life insurers already
weakened by credit losses. State insurance guarantee funds would be quickly
dissipated, leading to even greater runs on the insurance
industry.”
(For your reference,
AIG’s memo is up on our website with key sections highlighted.
Click here to view.)
- Globally, the
monster is three times larger than the $203.5 trillion in derivatives held
by U.S. banks: According to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS),
the worldwide total of just the unregulated, over-the-counter derivatives
alone was $604.6 trillion at mid-year 2009. Although down from 2008 peak
levels, it was up sharply from year-end 2008. (The
evidence.)
Global authorities
claim they want to tame this monster. In practice, however, they’re
doing everything they can to feed it and keep it growing.
It’s the same
derivatives monster that former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan & company
fought to protect back in the 1990s.
And it’s the
same derivatives monster that Bernanke and Geithner are struggling so
strenuously to protect today.
How? We’ve
detailed and quantified the weapons of mass expansion they’ve been
deploying in recent months:
But there’s
more …
Extend and
Pretend
New tax rules issued
by Mr. Geithner’s Treasury Department three months ago are now
prompting banks around the country to sweep bad maturing loans under the
rug simply by extending their terms — despite deteriorating
collateral values and even despite questionable payment
history.
These tactics —
widely known in the industry as “extend and pretend” or
“delay and pray” — are very similar to those used by
savings and loans in the 1970s and early 1980s, also with the tacit
encouragement of the regulators.
The big difference:
Today, a far larger percentage of those bad debts are leveraged up with
derivatives, another form of fuel for the growing monster.
Right now, the
banks’ extend-and-pretend tactics are especially popular in the one
loan sector that has the biggest troubles: commercial real
estate.
No one knows which
banks are the biggest offenders. But we do know which ones are the most
exposed:
As a rule, a
bank’s nonperforming commercial real estate loans should be no more
than a fraction of a percent of total assets. In contrast
…
- Tamalpais Bank
of San Rafael, California has 4.16 percent of its assets tied up in
nonperforming commercial real estate loans
- Builders Bank of
Chicago — 4.27 percent
- Mellon United
National in Miami — 4.46 percent
- Michigan
Commerce Bank in Ann Arbor — 4.55 percent
- Saehan Bank in
Los Angeles — 4.57 percent
- Bank of Florida
Southwest in Naples — 4.7 percent
- Bank of Miami in
Coral Gables — 5 percent
- Sun American
Bank in Boca Raton, FL — 5.37 percent
- Savings Bank of
Maine in Gardiner — 5.39 percent
- Westernbank
Puerto Rico in Mayaguez, PR — 5.84 percent, and
- United Central
Bank in Garland, TX — a whopping 9.95 percent.
None of these are
pipsqueak institutions — all have total assets of at least
half a billion. Plus, there are another 42 smaller U.S. banks with similar
— or greater — exposure to bad commercial real estate loans.
(For the complete list, click here.)
If the authorities
had any semblance of respect for their own pronouncements, they’d
crack down. Instead, they’re doing precisely the opposite —
aiding and abetting a bad-loan cover-up with new accounting rules that make
most of the cheating perfectly legal.
Looming FHA
Fiasco
The U.S. Congress and
the public are now painfully privy to the massive role that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac played in enabling American homeowners to overborrow …
enabling Wall Street to overleverage and fomenting the conditions that led
to the housing bust and derivatives disaster of recent years.
So … is that
why, in our infinite wisdom, we have encouraged the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) to do precisely the same thing, effectively picking up
from where Fannie and Freddie left off? When will we ever
learn?
Unfortunately, that
may not happen until AFTER the FHA goes bankrupt.
According to the
FHA’s own annual report, its Mutual Mortgage Insurance (MMI) capital
ratio — its single most important measure of solvency — has
plunged from 6.82 percent in 2006 to a meager 0.53 percent in
2009.
According to the
National Housing Act, the FHA is required to keep this ratio at 2 percent
or higher. So already, it is in violation of the Act. (For the evidence, click here.)
And despite promises
to remedy the problem, the stated goals of the FHA — to replace much
of the housing market lending support that was wiped away in the debt
crisis — is merely dragging it deeper into the hole.
Bottom
Line
In its encore
performance to create a new speculative bubble, Washington has done
virtually nothing to alter its old script. All it has done is replace some
actors and change some names.
For you, that means
two things:
First, it means that
bull markets — especially in sectors and countries that help
investors escape this madness — have obviously returned. And no
matter how much we may question their underpinnings, pragmatic investors
must take advantage of the short- and medium-term opportunities as they
come.
More importantly, it
means that risk is back … and with that risk comes the continuing
danger of unexpected busts.
Bottom line: Continue
to approach the financial markets with great caution, investing moderately,
taking profits out along the way, and retaining a big stash of
cash.
Good luck and God
bless!
Martin
P.S. Our 1-hour
video “11 Startling Forecasts for 2010″ is going offline this
week. To view it while you still can, click this link. Just bear in mind that we present our specific
investment recommendations near the end of the hour. So be sure to watch
from start to finish. Then, click here for my important follow-up.
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